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How Has McDonnell Affected Prosecutors’
Ability to Police Public Corruption? What Are
Politicians And Lobbyists Allowed To Do, And
What Are Prosecutors Able To Prosecute?
MODERATOR: Honorable Vincent L. Briccetti
PANELISTS:

Amie Ely
Alexandra Shapiro
Dan Stein

DEAN YASSKY: Good morning. My name is David Yassky.
I serve as the Dean here at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at
Pace University. I am just here right at the moment to welcome
you and thank you for joining us this morning. I have been
looking forward to this panel, this entire day of panels, for quite
some time.
When the McDonnell1 case came out, I wasn’t shocked by
the outcome because it seemed like it could go either way, but I
was certainly startled by the breadth of some of the language in
the opinion. My first thought was, my goodness, how are elected
officials and other government officials going to know what they
can do and what they can’t? How is this going to affect
prosecution going forward, and how will it affect the high-profile
convictions we have seen here in New York over the past few
years? The issue of government corruption or public integrity is
always prominent and has seemed extra prominent over the last
several years. Here in New York, we’ve seen the leaders of both
Houses of the State Legislature prosecuted, convicted, and now
maybe to be retried. We’ve seen a surprising number of elected
officials at both the State and local level prosecuted for various
forms of corruption, whether essentially embezzlement or bribetaking. And now, whatever one’s partisan leanings are, I think
we might all agree that there’s more talk about public integrity
at the Federal level than there has been in quite some time.

1. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
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This symposium could not be timelier, and I just wanted to
first thank all of the panelists who are here. We’ll recognize this
first group in just a moment. I also wanted to thank Mimi Rocah
and Carol Barry from our law school who put in a great deal of
work to put this together. I want to thank the Pace Law Review,
Editor-in-Chief Amanda Fiorilla, and the entire Law Review
team. I hope the panelists had a chance to take a look at the
briefing memo that the law review staff put together. It was, I
thought, a first-grade work of analysis. So, thank you for that. I
want to remind everyone also that our discussions today are
being transcribed and will be published in a special issue of the
Pace Law Review and then circulated to prosecutors throughout
the country. So, your work today is going to be setting the tone
and helping prosecutors for decades to come. Thank you for
undertaking that.
Our first panel and the question posed to the panelists is:
How has McDonnell2 affected prosecutors’ ability to police public
corruption? What can politicians and lobbyists do and what can
prosecutors prosecute?
We have, on all three panels, some of the really finest minds
in the country who have been thinking about these issues for
quite some time. On this first panel we have Amie Ely, who is
the Director of National Attorneys General Training and
Research Institute’s Center for Ethics and Public Integrity;
Alexandra Shapiro, former federal prosecutor and partner at
Shapiro Arato and has participated in numerous high profile
white-collar cases including the public integrity case; and Dan
Stein, former Criminal Division Chief and Chief of Public
Corruption at the Southern District U.S. Attorney’s office and
currently now partner at Mayer, Brown & Platt. And to guide
and shape the discussion and inform all of us we are very
fortunate to have, from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York right here in White Plains, the
Honorable Vincent Briccetti as the moderator. Your Honor, I
turn the podium over to you.

2. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, David, and thanks for
inviting me to participate. And also, Mimi, thank you so much
for inviting me.
I just want to say a couple of quick things about the panel.
Amie really brings a perspective that is unique on the panel,
namely that she’s working with the National Attorneys General
Training and Research Institute. The point is she’s very focused
on the State side or local side of the investigation and
prosecution in this area. All three of my colleagues up here are
former AUSAs in the Southern District of New York, as am I.
Alexandra and I also have two other things in common. We were
both Deputy Chief of Criminal Appeals in the Southern District,
and that was a fantastic job. Even more importantly, Alexandra
and I both started our own small law firms. It’s not easy and
that’s why I have so much respect for her. Dan is also a former
Chief of the Public Corruption Unit in the Southern District
which tells you how qualified he is for this.
What I’m going to do is give a quick overview of the
McDonnell3 case. These slides were prepared by Amie. So, I take
no credit for this whatsoever. Then each of the panelists will say
a few words and then I will interrogate them. I’ll ask them some
questions and hopefully that will elucidate some of the issues
here.
McDonnell v. United States,4 that’s the case that gives rise
to this symposium and this man’s name is Robert McDonnell.
Who is he and why do we care? Well, Bob McDonnell is a Virgina
lawyer. He was born in 1954. He served many years in the
Virginia House of Delegates. He was elected the Attorney
General of the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2005, and in 2009,
in the midst of the great recession, he was elected governor in a
landslide succeeding Tim Kaine, who went on to run for Vice
President. Kaine was term limit by Virginia law. Bob’s campaign
slogan was “Bob for Jobs.” That may foreshadow some of the
problems he got into later on. His focus in office was economic
development. He referred anyone, any constituent or any person
who had an idea about promoting business within the state, to
meetings with members of his staff and other government
3. Id.
4. Id.
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officials. One of those constituents was a fellow named Jonnie
Williams. Jonnie Williams was the CEO of a company that
developed a nutritional supplement called Anatabloc. I’m not
even sure if that’s how you pronounce it, but it’s a nutritional
supplement made from a compound found in tobacco. Of course,
there’s lots of tobacco in Virginia, so perfect. What Williams
needed to do was to have Virginia state universities do
independent research studies on the benefits, the health
benefits, of this nutritional supplement in order ultimately to get
approval from the Federal Food and Drug Administration. So, it
was very important for him to get this independent research
done within the State. Now, Jonnie was not shy about asking for
assistance from Bob McDonnell in this regard and to frankly
grease the skids a little bit. He gave McDonnell free rides on his
private plane during the campaign. He later bought McDonnell’s
wife, Maureen, $20,000 of designer clothing. In the meantime,
he repeatedly asked for the Governor’s help in getting research
studies done at Virginia’s public universities, and when Mrs.
McDonnell told Williams about her family’s financial problems,
I guess because Bob had been a public servant for so many years,
Williams loaned the McDonnells $70,000. He also gave their
daughter a $10,000 cash gift for her wedding and $15,000 to help
the McDonnells pay for the wedding. He took them on weekend
trips. Mrs. McDonnell at some point said, you know, my husband
really likes that Rolex watch that you wear and Jonnie said, no
problem. He went out and bought one, gave it to Maureen, and
Maureen gave it to Bob for Christmas. And what he was trying
to do was to get the Governor to support his plan to get research
done on Anatabloc at public universities in the state.
In return for Jonnie’s largesse, totaling some $175,000, the
Governor arranged numerous meetings, hosted several events,
made numerous phone calls, and contacted government officials,
all in an effort to support Williams’s plan to get research done
on Anatabloc at public universities in the State.
So, the question is: Did Bob McDonnell’s conduct constitute
public corruption? The jury at his criminal trial said yes. The
Supreme Court said no.
Here’s what happened: the Department of Justice charged
McDonnell and Maureen with bribery for accepting $175,000
worth of gifts and loans, as I’ve just described, the so-called quid,

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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money coming in, so to speak, and the quo was that it was in
exchange for arranging meetings, hosting events, making phone
calls, and contacting government officials to get them to support
this drug. He and his wife were charged with Hobbs Act
extortion and honest services fraud, which is basically mail
fraud and wire fraud, for depriving the citizens of Virginia of the
honest services of their governor. Importantly, and there will be
some discussion on this later on, the parties agreed that the case
turned on the meaning of the term “official act,” which is defined
in Section 201(a)(3) of Title 18.5 There was no dispute that he
took money, but the question is did he take it in exchange for an
“official act?” As I said, the McDonnells were convicted.
So, what is an official act under this statute? Well, it is any
decision or action, important words, on any question – all these
words are important obviously – or matter which may at any
time be pending or which may, by law, be brought before any
public official in such official’s official capacity or in such
official’s place of trust or profit. That’s a breakdown of Section
201(a)(3).6 The case turned on the definition of the meaning of
“official act.”
Now, at the Supreme Court, when the case finally made its
way there, McDonnell argued that “official acts” were only acts
that direct a particular resolution of a specific governmental
decision or that pressure another official to do so. So, just setting
up meetings or arranging phone calls was really not directing a
particular resolution of a specific governmental decision or
pressuring another official to do something. He said he was just
trying to do his job as the Governor of the State of Virginia to
promote economic development in the State. The government
said, well, first of all, you took $175,000 number one and number
two, we take a somewhat broader view of official act and it is a
decision or action that may at any time be pending or which may
by law be brought and, therefore, encompasses nearly any
activity by a public official. A very broad interpretation of
“official act.” The Supreme Court looked at the statute.7 They
looked at their own precedents, and they also discussed certain
constitutional concerns that they had. This was a decision
5. 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3) (2012).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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authorized by Chief Justice Roberts. The text of the statute,
again it is a decision or action on – meaning not an event,
meeting, or speaking with somebody – but an actual decision or
action on a question or matter. They narrowly construed the
words “matter” and “question.”8 They did that using principles
of statutory interpretation. And, as to the words “pending or
[which] may by law be brought,”9 they said that needs to be
something within the specific duties of an official’s position. So,
it is not just helping a constituent and referring them to the right
people within the state government but actually acting upon
something that is within the specific duties of an official position.
The precedent that the Supreme Court looked at were cases
that dealt with the statute in the past. The Sun-Diamond10 case
said that just meeting with officials was not enough without a
decision or action. McDonnell built on that, and said it would be
sufficient to initiate a research study or exert pressure to initiate
a research study so long as the official was intending that such
advice would form the basis for an official act by another official,
but that you need not actually make a decision or take an action,
you need only agree to do so. The Supreme Court also addressed
certain constitutional concerns. They didn’t find that the statute
was unconstitutional, but they construed it narrowly so as to
avoid constitutional concerns. The problem was that the
government’s position, as I said earlier, was so broad. What the
Supreme Court said is that this would cast a pall of potential
prosecution over an official who follows up on citizen complaints
and, for example, gets invited to a baseball game by a grateful
homeowner. So, a citizen makes a five-dollar contribution to the
campaign and says, “you know what, governor or public official,
we really need to do X in our neighborhood.” The public official
does that, and the neighborhood association says, that’s great;
why don’t you come to the minor league baseball game as our
guest? The Supreme Court was concerned that that would be a
crime, a felony under the Government’s interpretation of the
statute. The Supreme Court was also concerned about the socalled “vagueness shoal.” Vagueness is a due process
consideration and the Supreme Court said that it did not want
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999).
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federal prosecutors to set the standards of good government at
the local and state level. So, they needed to narrowly construe
the statutes involved.
This is the holding of McDonnell.11 An “official act” is a
decision or action on a question or matter that must involve a
formal exercise of governmental power that is similar in nature
to a lawsuit before a court or a determination before an agency
or a hearing before a committee. It must be specific. It must be
focused on something that is pending or may by law be brought
before the public official.
So, the Supreme Court said under that definition arranging
meetings, hosting events, etc. were not “official acts.”
And here is the rationale of McDonnell.12 Chief Justice
Roberts likes to have a turn of phrase from time to time and this
is his term of phrase in this one. Quote: “There is no doubt that
this case is distasteful; it may be worse than that, [b]ut our
concern is not with tawdry tales of Ferraris, Rolexes, and ball
gowns. It is instead with the broader legal implications of the
Government’s boundless interpretation of the Federal bribery
statute.”13 He went on to say that “[a] more limited
interpretation of the term ‘official act’ leaves ample room for
prosecuting corruption, while comporting with the text of the
statute and the precedent of [this] Court.”14
I think that might be the theme of today’s symposium
because that’s the question: does it leave ample room from
prosecuting corruption? Most people would think that taking
$175,000 in gifts and cash and Rolex watches and so forth in
connection with your job as a governor is public corruption. The
Supreme Court said no, it is not.
So, with that introduction what I would like to do is ask the
panelists to talk for a minute or two or however long they want,
about their take on this and what they think are the implications
of McDonnell, and what has actually happened since McDonnell.
11. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
12. Id.
13. Eyder Peralta, Supreme Court Throws Out Former Virginia Gov. Bob
McDonnell’s Conviction, NPR: THE TWO-WAY (June 27, 2016, 12:52 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/27/483711311/supremecourt-throws-out-former-virginia-governor-bob-mcdonnells-conviction.
14. Id.
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McDonnell was decided in June of 2016, almost two years ago.15
What has happened since then and where do we go from here?
So, why don’t we start with Dan. Dan was the Chief of Public
Corruption at the Southern District and he was also Chief of the
Criminal Division. This is a guy who knows what he’s talking
about, trust me on this. When Dan was doing that I was
primarily practicing in the criminal defense area. I’ve been a
prosecutor, but for most of my career, I was a criminal defense
lawyer. Dan was well-known for being tough, but fair. The point
is, he’s going to represent the prosecutor’s perspective and I’ll
ask Dan to go first.
MR. STEIN: Thank you for your kind introduction. The first
point I would want to make is that long before McDonnell, it was
my view, and I think many prosecutors’ view, that public
corruption prosecutions – particularly when they involve
allegations of quid pro quo bribery – were among the most
challenging and difficult cases to prosecute, even aside from the
issues presented by McDonnell. And to see why, I often thought
it was helpful to compare a quid pro quo bribery case to just sort
of a run of the mill securities fraud case.
In a securities fraud case, you have an arms-length
transaction between two parties where there are typically
representations made in an explicit way about what’s being
bought or sold. The challenge for a prosecutor trying to
investigate that transaction for fraud is simply to prove that
those representations are false or misleading or they omit
material information, that the representations are material, and
that the person who made them knowingly made those
misrepresentations. You compare that with a public corruption
bribery case where there’s almost never an explicit conversation.
There’s certainly not an explicit document that lays out the
terms of the transaction. The meetings that occur between those
who are seeking the influential elected official and the elected
officials in my experience in debriefing, are almost always –
there’s more left unsaid than said. I remember being at a
meeting with a person who we suspected made a bribe to an
elected official and this person in my view very candidly
15. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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explained the meeting that he had with that official and then
said, you know, at the end of the meeting I didn’t really know
what we agreed to or didn’t agree to, and I don’t know that the
person really knew either. It was all winks and nods and things
left unsaid. That always was a challenge. So, prosecutors always
had to look for substantial evidence to try to build a complete
picture of the circumstances to prove their case.
I think a second factor that also was always an issue before
McDonnell and public corruption cases is the political overlay
that lies behind many of these matters. I think unlike some
areas the problem is that in government and politics there can
be something of a zero-sum gain. Either my candidate wins or
your candidate wins; it’s one or the other. It’s not the case where
we can both succeed. So, the people who are making, providing
tips or information about alleged corruption often have motives
and agendas which may not be based on the merits of their claim
but rather based on their own political interests. So, prosecutors
are always also struck by that challenge that exists in public
corruption cases.
I think as Judge Briccetti alluded to in his introduction, the
critical thing for us to focus on in this discussion is to understand
that act is critically important – that the rules that govern public
officials and those who interact with public officials are clear
especially when the consequence is Federal criminal
prosecution. But I would say we should try not to lose sight of
what we are talking about here, which is efforts to make sure
that our public officials are, in fact, serving the public’s interests
and not their own private interests, while at the same time
making sure that our public officials are engaging the
community and are responsive to the public’s concerns. That
challenge is why these cases are so difficult. From a very high
level, my personal view of the consequences of McDonnell are
that perhaps it means that the way to address these problems is
not necessarily the blunt instrument of federal criminal
prosecution because it’s too hard in some cases for federal court
and federal prosecutors to articulate exactly what that line is
between pursuing private interests and yet on the other hand
making sure people are engaged in the community. I personally
think there is a whole array of ways that as citizens we can try
to assure that our representatives are really focused on the

9
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public’s interests and the reason Federal prosecutors got
involved is because the avenues are not being pursued. So,
maybe as McDonnell scales things back, it will be an incentive
for others to step forward and implicate it in other ways.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, Dan. Now, Alexandra is
also a former federal prosecutor, and she may have a slightly
different take on this.
MS. SHAPIRO: I’ll start with what I certainly agree with,
which is that these are very important problems, and I don’t
mean to minimize the real harm that’s caused by public
corruption. But what we are dealing with in McDonnell and a lot
of the cases we may talk about through the course of the panel
discussion are prosecutions of the state and local officials using
very vague and rather overbroad Federal statutes that are not
really the best instruments for dealing with these problems. I
think there are other tools that may be better.
In many states there are already quite a number of rules
and regulations and criminal laws in place to govern things like
conflicts of interest and other problems short of bribery that can
give rise to concerns that public officials are not acting in the
public’s interest. In my judgment, those are generally better
ways to deal with this, and to the extent that federal laws should
be used, we need to have clearer statutes.
I thought I would just talk for a few minutes about some of
the constitutional concerns, and in particular the due process
concerns that I think are animating the Court’s opinion in
McDonnell. If you listen to the oral arguments, they also suggest
that that was a very big concern. This case was decided by an
eight-justice Court just before Justice Gorsuch was appointed
but after Justice Scalia’s passing. I think the opinion is quite
narrow, but if Justice Scalia had survived and been part of the
discussions, you might well have had a different outcome in
terms of rationale. Certainly, there is a possibility that a
number of justices, if not the majority, might have voted to strike
down the honest services statute as unconstitutional and
vague.16
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
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Regardless, what the Court did do was part of a pattern in
a number of cases we’ve seen in the last decade, where the
Justices have expressed concerns with the abuse in some cases
by federal prosecutors of very broad statutes. Typically, what
the Court has done when confronting these statutes has been to
try to narrowly construe them. That’s what the Court did in the
Skilling case,17 which I think is discussed in the materials that
were circulated. In McDonnell, Chief Justice Roberts talks about
three constitutional concerns. One of them was the First
Amendment concern that we may touch on a little bit later – the
concern that in a democracy, if you have a statute that permits
anything, even a five-dollar payment for example, to count as a
“quid,” and anything, including a meeting, can be a “quo,” then
all kinds of normal interactions between constituents and
politicians would be potentially criminal.
One big part of the due process concern is notice. People
need clear statutes. The statutes are supposed to be written by
the legislature. If you look at most of the provisions of Title 18 of
the United States Code, it is as you would expect in a penal code.
The elements are right there in the statutes. If you look at the
jury instructions, they pretty much track the language in the
statute. What we are dealing with here, the two statutes at issue
in McDonnell (the honest services fraud statute18 and Hobbs Act
extortion statute19), are quite different. If you compare the
language of these statutes to the jury instructions, you will see
that the jury instructions contain language nowhere to be found
in the statute.
For example, the honest services fraud statute says that
mail or wire fraud can include a scheme or artifice “to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.”20 What does
that mean? We might all have our own definition of it, but it
could be just about anything. And using mail and wire fraud for
bribery is like putting a square peg in a round hole. A typical
scheme to defraud under the mail and wire fraud statutes is a
scheme to obtain money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, or false representations or promises. Well,
17.
18.
19.
20.

Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012).
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012).
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bribery typically does not involve any false representation or
promise. It is a payment in exchange for some sort of official
action.
As for the extortion provision of the Hobbs Act, bribery is
somewhat divorced from what the statute says and what its
purpose was. It talks about extortion “under color of official
right,”21 and the Supreme Court has held that that includes
bribery. But several justices starting with Justice Thomas in
the Evans case in the early ‘90s and more recently Justices
Breyer and Sotomayor, both expressed some doubts about
whether the statute even covers bribery.22 The history and the
language both suggest that what the statute is actually
addressing is an effort by an official to get property by
pretending to be entitled to it by virtue of his official position.
It’s very different from bribery.
There’s one other thing I want to mention that illustrates
why the Court was rightly concerned the dangers of the
overbroad use of these Federal statutes to prosecute state and
local officials. We can all agree with Chief Justice Roberts’
sentiment in the McDonnell opinion that the facts were
“tawdry.” We don’t want public officials to be taking lavish gifts
from their constituents. Unfortunately, at the time in question,
under Virginia law it was not illegal for public officials to take
these kinds of gifts. When the decision came out, in fact, the
press revealed that Senator Tim Kaine, who had previously also
been the Governor of Virginia, had taken some gifts from time
to time as Governor (although they weren’t nearly as lavish).
There was nothing wrong with it under state law, yet here you
had the federal government coming in and saying this is
criminal conduct. Fortunately, Virginia changed its law after the
prosecution of Governor McDonnell. I don’t know exactly what
the limits are, but I think there’s a pretty tight limit on the
amount of gifts public officials can accept in Virginia now. What
this illustrates, in my judgment, is that best way to deal with
these issues is to have appropriate state laws, and, to the extent
of there are loopholes in the state laws, to try to close them up.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (2012).
22. See Ocasio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1423, 1437 (2016) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); id. at 1445 n.3 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Evans v. United States,
504 U.S. 255, 278 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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It would be great if Congress could pass a clearer criminal
statute to deal with state and local public corruption in
appropriate circumstances, but who knows if that will happen.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: This is actually a great segue to
Amie’s expertise because she is focusing on what the impact of
McDonnell on state corruption prosecutions, and Alexandra just
said these kinds of things can be done locally and it is better if it
is done locally than it is federally so that seems to be the perfect
segue for Amie’s presentation.
MS. ELY: Thank you, Judge. Does McDonnell impact state
cases or do state prosecutors really need to worry about it? It
kind of depends on how you see McDonnell.
Some ways of looking at it are rather narrow: It is really just
a question of “official acts” under 201 and what that means, and
the case begins and ends with that. There is a paragraph in
McDonnell that talks a lot about the federalism issues, which I
think it is a great thing for state prosecutors to key in on if they
have McDonnell motions. If this is what McDonnell means, then
why be worried? This is not such a problem for state prosecutors.
There is another way of looking at it – I think Alexandra
will probably touch on some of these during our conversations
that will follow: Yes, this is a question of statutory construction,
but it’s also broader than that. In this reading, McDonnell is the
sibling of the chemical weapons case. It is the sibling of the “fish
case,” Yates,23 where the Supreme Court says an undersized
grouper is not a tangible thing. It is the sort of case that stands
for the idea that federal prosecutors, in particular, are
overreaching and the Supreme Court is going to construe
statutes narrowly to try to prevent that overreaching. It can also
be seen as more of our general “prosecutors are overreaching”
case, in that regard, and in that way can cause some problems
even for state prosecutors. There is also the Rule of Lenity
aspect, if the statute is vague, and then again we have the
federalism paragraph. If that is what McDonnell means, it’s a
little bit more troubling for state prosecutors.

23. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015).
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So, which is it? Is McDonnell narrow? Is it broad? Well, it’s
both. The cases have not been all of one mind. The judges have
not been all of one mind. We’ve got federal support for both
readings. We will talk about a narrow construction in the
Ferriero case.24 Some decisions have sort of a broad construction
of McDonnell, like the Tavares case.25 We’ll talk about that a
little bit and what it means for states with 201 cognates. There
are some state bribery statutes, like that in Massachusetts, that
are intentionally patterned after the federal section 201. In
those states, then I think McDonnell does pose a problem for
state prosecutors.
There is also state support for both the narrow and broad
reading. Again, we’ll talk a little bit more about the narrow
reading.
There’s a Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Veon,26 which
sort of talks about the McDonnell penumbra and suggests that
in cases that involve public officials, some of the animating
concerns – again that Alexandra talked about – about wanting
to have them representative democracy, about wanting to make
sure that your politicians can be responsive to the people who
they represent, are important. There is at least one case where
the Supreme Court of one state sort of took those concerns and
imported them into a state statute that was not similar to 201.
If McDonnell was construed narrowly by that Court, the judges
would not have cited it in the way they did to really reverse the
conviction.
So, looking a little bit more closely at a narrow state
decision, Degnan.27 It involves a garbage truck. So, in this case
the Mayor’s Chief of Staff, Mr. Degnan, threatened to terminate
a contract if the trash company did not donate a truck to a small
town in the Dominican Republic. Again, another Massachusetts
case. We’ve got that same cognate, but the Prosecutors here
charged both the official acts prong – which is very similar to
201’s official acts prong – and something a little bit broader: the
“official responsibilities” prong that was charged by the state
prosecutors in this case refers to the “direct administrative or
24.
25.
26.
27.

United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107 (3d Cir.2017).
Tavares v. Commonwealth, 89 N.E.3d 1168 (Mass. 2018).
Commonwealth v. Veon, 150 A.3d 435 (Pa. 2016).
Commonwealth v. Degnan, 73 N.E.3d 823 (Mass. 2017).
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operating authority, whether intermediate or final, and either
exercisable alone or with others, [and either] personal[ly] or
through subordinates, to approve, disapprove, or otherwise
direct [Government] action.”28 This is much broader than the
definition of “official act” under 201, and that was what saved
the day in this case.
The Court held that the contract was certainly within the
Defendant’s official responsibility. They cited McDonnell only for
the proposition that the jury was permitted to consider broad
range of pertinent evidence. We will get back to some of the ways
that prosecutors might deal with that. This gives you an idea
that what you charge, looking carefully at your statutes really
matters. And trying to find statutes that are not directly
imperiled by McDonnell can be a very helpful way to avoid a
falling prey to it.
Ferriero is a federal case.29 There were New Jersey state law
bribery predicates in this racketeering case. Ferriero was the
Chair of the county party organization. He recommended a
business to officials and got a kickback. The Third Circuit said
McDonnell is about statutory construction of one federal statute,
constitutional concerns raised by the Government’s position,
vagueness, and federalism.
Then, applying those four concepts to this racketeering case,
the Third Circuit said these are both bribery statutes but there
is no reason to transplant the conclusions of McDonnell that
stem solely from the Court’s application of general statutory
construction principles to 201, the particular statute at issue in
that case.
The Judges said that the New Jersey state bribery statute
was narrower than 201, so its constitutional concerns that
animated the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonnell were not
a problem here, and that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague.
And they acknowledged the federalism issue. This is an
interesting thing, I think particularly for federal prosecutors.
They said that even though the federal prosecutors are those
who are enforcing the law in this case, they are applying a state
28. 17 C.F.R. § 140.735-6(b), n.14 (2018).
29. United States v. Ferriero, 866 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2017).
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statute. They are applying a statute from New Jersey written by
the New Jersey legislature.
That was not an issue that was discussed in Tavares, that
First Circuit case, which was also a racketeering case. Again,
we’ve got the Massachusetts cognate there, so I think that that
may be one of the reasons why Ferriero and Tavares come out
differently.
I want to talk very briefly about a couple of state cases and
I think we will talk about some of the challenges that state
prosecutors can face in corruption cases. These cases can both
show some of the opportunity for enforcement at the state level
and some of the difficulties that prosecutors can face.
This photograph was taken, I believe, either the day that
Mike Hubbard was indicted or possibly the day after. He was the
Speaker of the House. He’s having a press conference. The
people around him are his fellow legislators in the state. This
was the response to charges brought by the Alabama Attorney
General’s office: It was a press conference held by the Defendant,
with the support of the people who he served with on the state
legislature. I’m so glad to see Dan Cort here, who you will have
a chance to hear from on a later panel, but having strong
leadership at the Attorney General level, and at the actual unit
level, I think is hugely important in these sort of cases. The lead
prosecutor was somebody who had been a federal prosecutor.
He’d been a state prosecutor. He was somebody who knew how
to build corruption cases.
There were allegations of politics, which I may get into a bit
once we have our discussions, and the sorts of things that federal
prosecutors do not have to deal with in quite the degree I think
than state prosecutors.
Hubbard was convicted after trial. At the trial level – even
though he wasn’t charged with violating the Alabama bribery
statute – at the trial level, there were McDonnell motions. On
appeal, I was told by the prosecutors, defense counsel abandoned
the McDonnell arguments.
This is another case that is, I think, more about sort of the
penumbra of McDonnell. This was a case, Utah v. Shurtleff,
where the former Attorney General of Utah was charged by a
local prosecutor. After those charges were filed, the McDonnell
case came out. The local prosecutor moved to dismiss the case
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based on both McDonnell and on Brady grounds.
The Utah bribery statute is quite dissimilar from the federal
bribery statute. I think that there are very strong arguments
that could have been made that McDonnell did not apply to it –
but I think the concern that McDonnell did may have animated
the decision by this Prosecutor to dismiss the case. One
important note, though: the Court, in its dismissal did not cite
McDonnell as grounds for dismissing the case.
A few final points: I think it is important for prosecutors to
be prepared to argue the limits of McDonnell and to make sure
they understand it, and that they look carefully at whether their
statutes are actually imperiled by it. I think there are very
strong arguments that it does not apply in most cases, as long as
your state does not have a cognate to 201.
I think for federal prosecutors, RICO prosecutions may be
safer, if they’re charging somebody in a state where the state
bribery law is not a cognate 201.
It is important for prosecutors to think about McDonnell
during the investigation. If you’re lucky enough to have a
proactive investigation where you’ve got a confidential
informant who can make a specific request for what it is the
official is going to do, make sure that “act” the CI requests is for
something that actually falls under your statute when you are
charging them.
Look really carefully at the statutes. If you’ve got something
where part of your statute is a cognate and part of your statute
is not, make sure you charge, if the facts support, the broader
possibility under your statute.
When you are thinking about your jury instructions,
obviously be precise. If you need to acknowledge McDonnell, do
that.
When you are looking at your verdict forms, you should
consider special verdict forms. You should consider whether you
think you are going to have official act issues. You should
consider listing what the quo was, what it is that you are
alleging that your official did and let the jury make a specific
determination about what quos you have proven. They are
obviously downsides to using special verdict forms, as well, but
it is something that the prosecutors should consider.
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Dan, I have a question for you. Here’s
my question:
Of course, you were Chief of Public Corruption; where do
you see McDonnell having a greater impact for prosecutors, at
the charging stage, in other words, when they have to decide
whether to indict and decide whether a prosecution will be
successful because naturally you do not want to indict unless you
are pretty darn sure you are going to prevail, or does it have a
greater impact at the trial phrase, meaning the higher burden
articulated by McDonnell? Where do you think McDonnell has
the greatest impact?
MR. STEIN: So, I think in the short term it can be the trial
phase because there were cases before McDonnell that
prosecutors had to sort out at a trial and retrial.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Such as Skelos30 and Silver.31
MR. STEIN: But I think in the long term you are going to
see it more at the charging phase. I think one example that we
should all think about, although I do not have direct first-hand
knowledge, but you can see in New York City, where there was
a long-running investigation that became public of the Mayor.
You had people who pled guilty to paying bribes to the Mayor,
and the Mayor was not charged. The U.S. Attorney’s office
announced that they were not to charge him. I suspect, although
I do not know, that McDonnell had something to do with that
because the evidence might have been that at least in the
Mayor’s perspective of what he was doing was receiving
contributions in order to have meetings and not to perform
official acts.
I think the other places where you are going to see an impact
of McDonnell is in how prosecutors allocate their resources.
Whereas McDonnell they might have focused on trying to prove
cases of quid pro quo corruption. They might decide now that
there are other areas where they can focus their resources. There
are many cases that we did in the Southern District before
30. United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017).
31. United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
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McDonnell and hopefully will after McDonnell, that have
nothing to do with quid pro quo bribery. They have to do with
elected officials putting supporters or cronies or girlfriends or
siblings in charge of not-for-profit organizations, directing
grants to those not-for-profit organizations, and having the
money circle back to them. McDonnell has nothing to say about
those cases. You might see prosecutors focused more on that. I
feel sometimes certainly in the news these days, I have not heard
enough discussion of this, but at the Federal level there is a
conflict of interest statute that does not require a quid pro quo,
but does require that federal officials participate personally and
substantially in some official action while having a conflict of
interest. You might see prosecutors focusing more on those kinds
of cases where again McDonnell has nothing to say about it.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: So, you really think that the direct
impact of McDonnell is going to encourage the prosecutors to
move away from the honest services prosecution which has been
so prevalent in the past? No one suggested that a governor
taking all this money in gifts is okay. So, they are going to still
find ways to prosecute, right?
MR. STEIN: That is right. I think what is really telling
McDonnell is that Virginia did not have a law that made it
impermissible for the governor to take gifts. If you look at some
of the cases, for example, they sort of respond to some of the
points Alexandra made. The prosecutor still has to prove corrupt
intent and they still have to look for evidence that the target was
intentionally concealing his conduct or trying to invade state
restrictions of what they could or could not do or be dishonest
about what they were taking or receiving. I think when you have
that kind of evidence of someone who is not just receiving gifts
in exchange for some official action but someone who is clearly
concealing it, lying about it, or trying to structure their behavior
or evade state requirements, that would go to establish a corrupt
intent and be helpful facts to prosecutors.
One other point I would make is part of what worries me a
little bit about McDonnell, as a former prosecutor, is the fact that
the people who are engaged in the conduct at issue are aware of
McDonnell in many instances. Amie mentioned that it would be
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wise for prosecutors to instruct their informants to make a
specific act or a specific official action and the thought occurred
to me that if someone is running an investigation, that that is
sure fire way of getting your targets. As soon as they heard that,
they would say, no, this is just a meeting to not engage an official
action but rather to have access to public officials.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: There are other statutes that could be
utilized by federal prosecutors such as Section 666 of Title 18,32
which, as I understand it, basically makes it a crime to accept or
demand money with the intent to be influenced in connection
with one’s official duties, when the person is an official of an
agency that receives federal benefits in excess of $10,000 within
a one-year period. Does McDonnell apply to Section 666
prosecutions, and what recent cases involve Section 666?
MS. SHAPIRO: That is an interesting question that has
been litigated a bit already in the Southern District of New York
and in the Second Circuit.
There was a case decided last summer, a few days before the
Silver decision,33 United States v. Boyland,34 in which the Circuit
affirmed the conviction. Boyland had been charged under
several different statutes including Section 666. The Court held
that the jury instruction in Boyland on the honest services fraud
statute was no good after McDonnell because of the
constitutional concerns, even though unlike in McDonnell, the
parties had not agreed to use the Section 201 definition.
Nevertheless, the Court goes on to say that it does not reach the
same conclusion with respect to the instructions about the § 666
count, supposedly because § 666 “is more expansive than § 201,”
in that it “prohibits individuals from ‘solicit[ing]. . . anything of
value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in
connection with any business, transaction, or series of
transactions of [an] organization, government, or agency. . . . We
do not see that the McDonnell standard applied to these

32. 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012)
33. United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
34. 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017).
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counts.”35
I think this is a little odd, because clearly the honest
services fraud statute doesn’t remotely contain these terms in
Section 201 either. But in any event, this is somewhat of a throw
away paragraph in this opinion which goes on, by the way, to
find that the errors in the other jury instructions are harmless
errors. There are several § 666 cases that are pending where this
issue has come up, and in some of them the government has
taken the position that under Boyland McDonnell doesn’t apply.
We had this issue with the Skelos case, which was decided
about a month after this.36 There, the Court asked us for
supplemental briefing on Boyland as well as Silver, which also
was decided before they decided Skelos. We argued two things:
first, we argued that Skelos was different, because the “official
act” instruction was the same for the § 666 count and the other
charges (Hobbs Act extortion as well honest services fraud). The
District Court had given one official act instructions that applied
to all the counts. The government had asked for that, and the
indictment also described eight alleged official acts that were
applicable to all the counts. That was our main argument. We
also argued, without quite saying that Boyland should be
overturned, that it didn’t make sense. The Court of Appeals in
the Skelos case ended up agreeing with us. The Court held that
because of the way the case was indicted and tried, it could not
affirm the § 666 count on the grounds that McDonnell did not
apply. And the Government has indicated in a letter to us that
they are not going to take the position at the retrial that the
§ 666 count does not require proof of an official act as defined in
McDonnell.
There was another case which I tried last summer involving
alleged bribery of two U.N. officials by a Chinese businessman,
in which we had a similar debate at the charge conference. The
Government argued very strongly that McDonnell should not
apply and opposed an official act of instruction, and Judge
Broderick gave an official act of instruction. But it was a
watered-down version of the instruction and did not use the
specific language from the definition of McDonnell. I suspect
35. Id. at 291 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012); emphases and alterations
in original).
36. See United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017).
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that issue eventually may be decided by the Second Circuit.
In the Percoco case,37 which as far as I know is still on trial
unless there’s been a verdict or a mistrial this morning, this
issue came up as well. Judge Caproni did decide that the official
act instructions should be consistent with McDonnell and
applied to all the counts, including those based on § 666. She
said she was only doing it because of the way the indictment was
charged. She also issued an opinion on the motion to dismiss
rejecting the applicability of McDonnell to § 666.38 So, I think
you are going to see more percolation of this issue, and maybe
the Second Circuit will revisit it in a case where it has a lot more
importance to the outcome than it did in Boyland.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Now, Amie, traditionally the
principal reason why federal prosecutors have pursued
investigations and prosecutions of state and local officials is
because of the perception that federal prosecutors have more
resources. They have the FBI. They have the federal
government, but as you said earlier, it doesn’t have to be done
by the feds. It could be done by the state. Is there a problem
about resources? Are there resources available to local
prosecutors to meet the challenges of prosecuting local officials?
MS. ELY: The short answer is it depends. Just looking at
the state attorney general office systems, some attorneys
general have complete criminal jurisdiction in their state. Some
attorneys general have very little. Like the district attorney’s
office, the very, very busy places are less likely to be able to do
the long-term, thoughtful investigation that you need to do in
any kind of white-collar case – including and especially public
corruption cases.
That said, I will talk about some successes and then I will
talk about some challenges.

37. United States v. Percoco et al., 16-CR-776 (VEC), 2017 WL 6314146
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017).
38. Id. at *4.
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Right around the same time that the Menendez39 case and
the Seabrook40 cases in New Jersey and New York, respectively,
were declared mistrials, a state Senator named Phil Griego was
convicted in New Mexico in a case brought by the Attorney
General. It is not a one-to-one sort of comparison, but it is an
example of a state corruption prosecution success. Michael
Hubbard was convicted in Alabama, despite some real political
issues. The attorney general’s office there also successfully
prosecuted the Governor of the State.
New York has convicted a number – at the DA-level and
through the AG’s office – a number of officials including Rubin
Willis, a city councilman.
And New Jersey, at the AG office level, convicted the Mayor
of Paterson.
So, there are some really terrific cases, perhaps that are not
in the press quite so much but are really important and show
that there are in some states really capable, strong enforcers.
There are resource issues. Some of those can be financial.
Some of those financial issues can be occasioned by the cases
themselves. In Alabama, when Mike Hubbard was charged, at
some point during his trial, the legislature threatened to strip
the funding from the entire attorney general’s office. Not just the
corruption unit, but the entire office. That is the sort of challenge
that a federal prosecutor does not have to face.
That said, about a week ago the now-former Attorney
General of the state whose office was imperiled in that way gave
a speech to other Attorneys General in D.C., and encouraged
them to have corruption units. He said, “[i]f you’re looking for
something that’s turbulence free, this is not the way to do it. If
you really care about representing the people of your state about
ensuring that we have good government, this is a really
important space for us to work in.”
For the attorneys general offices that have jurisdiction to do
this kind of work, they do have a little bit more ability, I think,
than district attorneys to do the longer-term cases, to start
trying to partner with federal authorities.
39. United States v. Menendez, 291 F. Supp. 3d 606 (2018).
40. United States v. Seabrook, 16-CR-467, 2017 WL 3995630 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 2017).
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There are certainly cases that are investigated by both
federal and state authorities, which is something that I’m
frankly trying to push, particularly after McDonnell. I think
McDonnell does provide an opportunity for the state and federal
officials to intentionally work together in a thoughtful way to
figure out who’s got the resources and who has the laws to
appropriately deal with behaviors that, without a doubt, citizens
are very unhappy about and very disgusted by.
There are some ways resources and training available for
state and local prosecutors, including my Center for Ethics and
Public Integrity. We can do training for prosecutors to teach
them how to investigate these more complex cases. Jennifer
Rodgers’s Center on Advancement of Public Integrity also has a
lot of terrific resources.
I will end on this: one of the big changes from being a federal
prosecutor to working with state prosecutors is recognizing that
federal subpoenas are a beautiful thing and they go everywhere.
State subpoenas only go to the end of state line. So, there’s
something called the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings. This
is the sort of thing that is important to state prosecutors doing
more complicated cases where you need to have the ability to, for
example, get bank records from outside of your state. You need
to have the ability to not have the boundary of your state be
impermeable. We’ve pulled together a chart with information
about the Uniform Act statutes across the country and are trying
to develop contacts around country so we can “matchmake” when
prosecutors need help in another state. And we have provided
training about how to get out-of-state materials, so they can
investigate these more complicated cases, including corruption
cases.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Thank you, Amie. Dan, we have been
talking about the prosecution of state and local officials, but of
course, federal officials have been the subject of corruption
prosecutions as well. My question is, is there a difference
between how federal prosecutors approach corruption
investigations of state and local officials as opposed to cases
involving federal officials?
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MR. STEIN: In some ways, yes and in some ways, I think
the answer is no. The benefit of working on an investigation of a
federal official as a federal prosecutor is you don’t need to worry
about all the legal complexities that come including at the
honest services fraud statute or the § 666 statute or Hobbs Act
extortion which in my view are all really efforts to shoehorn
Federal jurisdiction over State and Local officials, perhaps
appropriately, perhaps not.
People have different views about that. In federal cases
dealing with federal officials you really do not have to worry
about those things. You have statutes that apply. You have the
conflicts of interest statute. That is a good example. In Skilling,41
the Supreme Court said that honest services fraud would not
reach claims of conflicts of interest. Pure conflicts of interest
about a quid pro quo of a bribery or a kickback because the
statute does not provide for that and made an analysis about
what the core of the statute was. You do not have the concern
with federal officials because as I said in this conflicts of interest
statute that Congress has spoken about clearly. It was my
experience at least that most of my cases involved New York
officials there was a much greater degree of transparency when
dealing with the federal government whether in the legislature
or an executive agency where you could at least track in a clear
way what bills you were to produce, by whom, who lobbied on
support of those bills, what action were taken by a federal
agency. It is much more transparent at the federal level than it
sometimes is at the state level.
In New York State, to just figure out when a bill was issued
and what was introduced and by whom, can be a real challenge,
and so I think often and also even trying to track state funds
through state agencies can be incredibly complicated. In my
experience in the federal government, there is much greater
transparency and, therefore, at least I think, it makes it easy for
prosecutors to trace money and to try to figure out whether those
cases were at the state level.

41. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358 (2010).
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: Alexandra, most of what we have
been talking about today involves private benefits received by a
public official or his family rather than receiving campaign
contributions, but why are not there more prosecutions involving
campaign contributions? Hypothetically, I’ll contribute $100,000
to your campaign but you’ve got to do this for me. Quid pro quo,
no question about it. Why aren’t there more of those
prosecutions?
MS. SHAPIRO: I think the main reason has to do with a
Supreme Court case called McCormick,42 and because campaign
contributions are speech protected by the First Amendment.
It goes all the way back the way back to Buckley v. Valeo in
the ‘70s.43 The Supreme Court held that campaign contributions
are protected by the First Amendment. As a result of that, the
Court later held that in a quid pro quo bribery case, where the
bribe was allegedly a campaign contribution, prosecutors had to
prove that an explicit quid pro quo. By contrast, when you’re
talking about a private benefit, like the gifts to Governor
McDonnell, the agreement does not need to be explicit. There is
a notion that if you can prove winks and nods, that’s enough,
because it would be rare that you could really prove a more
explicit agreement, unless you had wiretap. And, by the way,
some Courts have said in this context that there is a difference
between “express” and “explicit.” I think that is a bit silly,
personally, but regardless, it is much more difficult to prove a
quid pro quo in the campaign contribution context because of the
McCormick case.
I do not have any personal knowledge of the investigation of
the Mayor, but I always wondered if part of the problem for the
prosecutors might also have something to do with this principle
there as well. As I understood it, the allegations were all
contribution-related, and perhaps proof of an explicit agreement
was lacking. Unlike McDonnell, that has been the state of the
law for a long time. It is just a function of our Constitution and
how the Supreme Court treats campaign contributions.

42. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
43. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
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MR. STEIN: Can I jump in on that question, as well?
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Sure.
MR. STEIN: I think that is right in terms of the
investigation of the Mayor. One quick point that I would like to
see more prosecutors try to do, if possible, is it always occurred
to me that it makes perfect sense to say, I am making a
contribution of an exercise of one’s speech rights if you are
supporting a candidate in their efforts to get out the message
and make public their positions. I would like to see more
prosecutors look at candidates than take campaign funds for
their own personal uses. There’s a fraud on their contributors
because their contributors are making donations thinking the
money is going to be used for these speech-related purposes, but
if it is just going into the candidate’s pocket, that really is
something different.
One quick story on that that I always laughed at: We had a
Senator in New York who was prosecuted many years ago. He
was picked up on a wiretap talking to another elected official
about how campaign funds could be used and could not be used
and his explanation was as long as my constituents would want
it, then I could spend the campaign money on it. For example,
he said my constituents want me to look good. I can use the
money to buy some new suits.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: I am going to ask Dan one more
question and then I am going to try to leave a few minutes to
take questions from the audience. It is kind of related to the last
thing you said. Does it matter whether the action taken by a
public official was desirable or beneficial; does it matter if the
public official has taken the same action regardless of the money
received, or if he does a good thing with the money he received?
Does that matter in this context?
MR. STEIN: I think the short answer is no. It really does
not matter. As a legal matter, I think in the Silver case, for
example, one of his defenses was the grant money that I gave as
the quo, in the quid pro quo, was for cancer research and who
would oppose cancer research, and that prosecution’s take was
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that may or may not be, but the reason you gave that money was
not out of some public minded purpose but because of the private
interest.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: The private interests were what in
that case?
MR. STEIN: That he was receiving referrals for asbestos
cases.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Under New York law he was able to
affiliate with the law firm and in effect receive referral fees for
cases that came in the law firm involving people who have had
cancer as a result from asbestos; is that correct?
MR. STEIN: Correct.
MS. SHAPIRO: Can I just make one comment?
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Sure.
MS. SHAPIRO: I agree with what you said. It is definitely
never the case that there would be any defense based on the
public good that comes from the legislation. But certainly in the
Skelos44 case and in some other cases, there might be an
argument that has to do with the strength of the government’s
proof of the politician’s supposed corrupt intent.
For example, in the Skelos45 case, the parts of the case that
do not involve the meetings and all of the things that aren’t
official acts after McDonnell, involved two kinds of legislation.
One of our arguments was, and will continue to be, that there is
no way that he could have had a corrupt purpose or intended to
sell his vote on the legislation in exchange for these folks hiring
his son, because he was known to be a supporter of the
legislation already and would have continued to support it
regardless.

44. United States v. Skelos, 707 F. App’x. 733 (2d Cir. 2017).
45. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: We could go on all day. These issues
are not new. Those of us who are old enough to remember the
Abscam prosecution back in the ‘70s involving basically sting
operations with both federal and local officials. A lot of these
issues came up then, and they continue to come up today. This
panel is unbelievably knowledgeable about this. So, we could
spend a whole day just with this panel, but we are not going to
do that. There are other panels who are terrific, as well. Does
anybody have a question or a comment? Yes, sir?
ATTENDEE: Mr. Stein, with relation to Silver,46 ultimately
a conviction or gets a new conviction, would that have an effect
on the asbestos cases? Can now because of his referrals to say a
litigant who feels or thinks they did not get the proper
representation and they should have gotten a bigger piece of that
pie, do you think there is going to be a trickle-down effect?
MR. STEIN: To be honest, I’ve never thought about that
possibility.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: Usually you say that is a great
question.
MR. STEIN: I think I have to say I do not know if there
would be any implication. There was never, as far as I know, any
allegation that the law firm did not do a good job on the asbestos
cases. I think from the prosecution’s perspective it was merely a
way to get money to Mr. Silver, but that is a good question.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: For which there is no answer.
Everyone who is in law school, well, the answer could be this or
it could be that. Does anybody else have a question?
ATTENDEE: Could one of you comment more about the
Boyland47 case and the implications of McDonnell setion 666
prosecutions? I guess I am trying to understand how the

46. United States v. Silver, 864 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2017).
47. United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017).
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McDonnell48 ruling affects or could affect future section 666
prosecutions because a quick look at the Boyland49 decision did
not clarify it.
MS. SHAPIRO: No, it doesn’t. It really is just that
paragraph that I read. And, if I remember the facts of the case
correctly, one of the reasons the error was harmless was that it
was pretty obvious that the acts Boyland50 was allegedly taking
in exchange for the payments for were clearly official acts under
McDonnell.
JUDGE BRICCETTI: One last question. Yes, sir?
ATTENDEE: Dan, you had mentioned possibly using the
public – the conflict of interest statute when prosecuting federal
officials as opposed to McDonnell. Would the definition for
“public action” be the same under that statute because that is
where McDonnell kind of stepped in? I just wondered what the
public action would be in a conflict of interest case as opposed to
the other way?
MR. STEIN: I would have to look more closely at the exact
language. I think it is pretty similar in the conflict of interest
statute that the real difference is you do not have to prove that
there was a quid pro quo. Simply taking an action while having
a conflict of interest is sufficient. It does not have to be that you
took the action in exchange for some payments and benefits.
ATTENDEE: It is just that McDonnell technically said he
did not take an official action. I was just wondering if that would
change under 208.
MR. STEIN: That is an excellent question. It probably does
not change on that piece. It is more on the quid pro quo side of
it.

48. McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016).
49. United States v. Boyland, 862 F.3d 279 (2d Cir. 2017).
50. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol38/iss3/3
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JUDGE BRICCETTI: We have had a terrific panel. Thank
you all very much.
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